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Campbell: VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016)

VMG SALSOUL, LLC v. CICCONE,
824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
I.

INTRODUCTION

If the lay listener cannot recognize that a portion of a song
has been sampled, should the sampler be liable for copyright
infringement? Instinctively, one might assume that liability ensues
any time a copyright infringer misappropriates copyrighted
materials.' However, traditional copyright law allows infringers to
raise affirmative defenses. Of the available defenses, a copyright
infringer may argue that their use was so minimal that an "average
audience would not recognize the appropriation." 2 This defense is
referred to as de minimis use.3 While the de minimis use defense is
often asserted in copyright cases, the real question is whether de
minimis use is a viable defense to claims arising from the
appropriation of sound recordings.
The Ninth Circuit was recently faced with this question in
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone (hereinafter "VMG Salsoul") 4 In a
surprising split from the Sixth Circuit's finding in Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, the Ninth Circuit held that the de
minimis use exception does apply to infringement actions
regarding copyrighted sound recordings.5 The Ninth Circuit's
holding in VMG Salsoul has created a split between two influential
circuits representing the music industry.6 The divide between
' The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.

§ 501(a) (1978).

2 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004).

"Copying has occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative
threshold of substantial similarity." 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03(A) 13-27
(2017).
4 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
5id.

6Nashville, Tennessee, has the highest concentration of music industry jobs in

the nation. The second highest concentration is in Los Angeles, California.
Nashville is located within the United States' Sixth Circuit and Los Angeles is
in the Ninth Circuit. GLENN PEOPLES, Want a Job in the Music Business?
These Are the Cities You Should Live In, BILLBOARD, Aug. 13, 2013,
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these two circuits creates ambiguity in the music industry with
regards to the validity of the regular practice of music sampling.
This article will present a discussion of whether the Ninth
Circuit's application of the de minimis use exception to sound
recordings in VMG Salsoul is consistent with the application of de
minimis use in copyright law. The background section will
address the concept of copyright infringement and the application
of the de minimis use exception's application to copyright law in
general.7 Part III summarizes the Ninth Circuit's decision in VMG
Salsoul. Part IV discusses the broader legal implications of the
circuit split between two influential circuits in the music industry. 9
II.

BACKGROUND

A. CopyrightInfringement
The dispute in VMG Salsoul arises from the plaintiffs
assertion that the defendants infringed the copyrights to the
composition and sound recording of the song Love Break. 0 It is a
firmly rooted principle in copyright law that copyright protection
only extends to the expression of an idea and not the idea itself."
Under § 106 of the Copyright Act, Congress delineates the specific
rights exclusive to a copyright holder.1 2 Copyright infringement is

http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/5650624/want-a-job-in-the-music-

business-these-are-the-cities-you-should-live-in-from.
7

Infra notes 10-48.
Infra notes 49-137.
9 Infra notes 138-172.
10 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2016).
11 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
12 Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
8
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defined in § 501(a) as any person who violates the exclusive rights
of a copyright holder.1 3 The Section specifically states:
Anyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided by sections 106
through 122 or of the author as
provided in 106A(a), . . . is an

infringer of the copyright or right of
the author, as the case may be. For
purposes of this chapter, any
reference to copyright shall be
deemed to include the rights
conferred by section 106A(a). 14
To establish copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove its
ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied the
protected material.15 A valid copyright is an original work that
was independently created, possesses a "modicum of creativity,"1 6

(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §106 (1978).
13 The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §501(a) (1978).
14 Id.
1s

16

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
Id. at 346.
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and is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.1 7 If the evidence
provided to prove originality shows minimal effort was applied
then there must be a more substantial showing of creativity before
copyright protection will attach." In order to establish the second
prong of the infringement test, the plaintiff must show that
defendant copied the original work, with either direct or
circumstantial evidence, and that the two works are substantially
similar.' 9
i.

Access

Proof of copying is essential to a claim of copyright
infringement because without copying there can be no finding of
infingement. 20 However, because direct evidence of copying is
rare, a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to prove the
defendant replicated the plaintiffs original work. 2 1 Use Of
circumstantial evidence requires a fact-based showing that the
defendant had access to the infringed work and that the two works
22
In order to prove the defendant had
are substantially similar.
access to the copyrighted work it must be shown that the defendant
had "an opportunity to view or to copy plaintiffs work." 23
However, access requires more than mere speculation, it must be
reasonably possible that the defendant viewed or heard the
copyrighted material.2 4 When direct evidence of access is
unavailable to the plaintiff, the copying can be proven by a
showing of striking similarity between the two works sufficient to
Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2006).
2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 901(A), at 2-13 (1987).
Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.
1977).
20
Arnstein v. EdwardB. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1946).
21 Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th
Cir. 1984).
22 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000).
23 Id. at 482 (quoting Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977)).
F.2d
24
Bolton, 212 F.3d at 482.
18
19
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"raise an inference of access."25 A striking similarity sufficient to
infer access, without direct proof, requires the similarities between
the two works be "so striking as to preclude the possibility that the
defendant independently arrived at the same result." 26 In other
words, while striking similarities can permit an inference of
access, the plaintiffs proof must establish that the inference of
access is reasonable.2 7
ii.

Substantial Similarity: Intrinsic/Extrinsic Test

Once access has been established, the next question in the
analysis is whether the copied version is substantially similar to
the plaintiffs original work. 2 8 In order to determine substantial
similarity the Ninth Circuit 9 follows an intrinsic/extrinsic
analysis. 3 0 To have improper appropriation there must be both
substantial similarities of the general ideas as well as substantial
similarities of the expression of the ideas.31 The extrinsic test is
the determination of whether the ideas are substantially similar. 3 2
This test is an objective comparison of specific expressive
Gibb, 741 F.2d at 901.
Nimmer, Copyright § 13.02 at 13-9 (1983).
27 Gibb, 741 F.2d
at 902.
28
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
29 When determining substantial similarity, the Sixth Circuit first determines
which parts of the original work are protectable. If there are any protectable
elements in the original work, then the court assesses whether defendant's
allegedly infringing work rises to the level of substantial similarity when
compared with the original copyrighted work. While similar to the Ninth
Circuit's extrinsic/intrinsic test, the Sixth Circuit follows a stricter standard for
determining when to allow expert testimony. Additionally, the first step of the
Sixth Circuit's test functions to filter out unoriginal elements from the very
start. Overall, while there are similarities between the Sixth and the Ninth
Circuits tests for substantial similarity, they are not identical. Murray Hill
Publ'ns., Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir.
2004) (citing Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855 (6th Cir. 2003)).
30
Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
31
Id. at 1164.
25
26

3 2 Id.
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Both analytic
elements that can be listed and analyzed.33
phase of the
may
be
used
at
this
and
expert
testimony
dissection
~34 - - -If similarities are
analysis because this is a question of fact.
revealed during the extrinsic test then the court proceeds to an
intrinsic evaluation. 3 5 The intrinsic test analyzes the two works to
determine if there is a substantial similarity in the forms of
expression.36 This is a subjective analysis that requires the trier of
fact to determine if an ordinary reasonable person would find the
two works to be substantially similar. 37 At this stage of the
analysis, analytic dissection and expert testimony are not
allowed.3 8 Ultimately, if an average audience would fail to
recognize the appropriation from the original work then there is no
evidence of substantial similarity. 39
B. De Minimis Use Defense
The primary purpose of Copyright law is to create incentives
for individuals who exert creative efforts.4 0 The defense of "de
minimis non curat lex" 41 insulates individuals from liability when
their violation of another person's rights are so minimal so as to be
insignificant. 42 Specifically, the de minimis use exception helps
limit unnecessary restrictions on a person's fair use of language,
symbols and figures.4 3 Within the context of copyright law, de
minimis can mean: a technical violation of another person's right

33Id.
34

d.

35

id.

37

id.
id.

38

Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.

39 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, Article I, § 8, cl. 8.
41 The law does not concern itself with trifles.
42 Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997).
43 E. Scott Johnson, ProtectingDistinctive Sounds: The ChallengeofDigital
Sampling, 2 J.L. & TECH. 273, 277 (1987).
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that is so trivial that the law will not impose any significant
consequences, the copying is too trivial to constitute any kind of
substantial similarity between the works, or in context with the
defense of fair use. 4 4 Therefore, de minimis copying is best
viewed as a determination of plaintiffs proof of substantial
similarity instead of as a separate defense to copyright
45
infringement.
In VMG Salsoul, the de minimis defense is implemented to
establish that if copying is established, it is such an insignificant
amount of copying that no level of substantial similarity can be
established between the two works.46 In other words, the use
should be considered de minimis because an average audience
would be unable to recognize the appropriation. 4 7 This analysis of
the de minimis defense hinges on the test for substantial similarity
and the need for an ordinary observer to be able to determine
whether the use was either innocent copying or a significant
misappropriation.4 8
HI.

VMG SALSOUL, LLC V. CICCONE
A. FactualBackground

VMG Salsoul, LLC ("Salsoul") 4 9 is a New York based
record company now owned by Bertelsmann Music Group
(BMG).so In the early 1980's Shep Pettibonest recorded the song

44 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-75.

45 Situation Mgmt. Sys. v. ASP ConsultingLLC, 560 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009).
46 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2016).
47
Diamond, 388 F.3d at 1193.
48

d

49 Plaintiff in the initial action.
50 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184127, at *3
(C.D.
Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).; Ed Christmas, BMG Acquires Catalog of Verse Music,
Includes Songs ofNina Simone, J. Lo, BILLBOARD, June 29, 2015,
http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6612981/bmg-acquiresverse-musicnina-simone-j-lo-salsoul-west-end-bethlehem-golden-records
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Ooh I Love It ("Love Break') for Salsoul.5 2 Love Break features a
"single" and a "double" horn hit that are at issue in this case.53
The "single" horn hit is a quarter-note chord comprised of the
notes, E-flat, A, D, and F, played in the key of B-flat. 5 4 The
"double" horn hit is an eighth-note chord consisting of the same
notes as the "single" horn hit, immediately followed by the same
Both the single and double
notes played in a quarter-note chord.
horn hits were played predominately by trombones and trumpets. 5 6
During the course of the instrumental version of Love Break,
which lasts seven minutes and forty-six seconds, the single horn
hit is played twenty-seven times and the double horn hit is played
twenty-three times.5 7 The general pattern of the horn hits in the
instrumental version were identified as, "single-double repeated,
double-single repeated, single-single-double repeated, and doublesingle repeated." 5 8 VMG Salsoul owns both the copyright to the
sound recording and to the composition of Love Break.5 9
In 1990, Pettibone and Ciccone 6 0 recorded the hit single
Vogue.61 Like in Love Break, Ciccone's top 100 dance song also
features a "single" and a "double" horn hit.62 The single horn hit

51

One of the defendants.

52 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2016).
53
Id.
54 Id.
55Id.
56 As determined by the plaintiff s experts. Id.
57

id.

5 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 875.
59
id.
60 Defendant Madonna Louise Ciccone is an American singer/songwriter
commonly referred to as "Madonna." Famous works by the singer/songwriter
include "Like a Virgin," "Crazy for You," "Take a Bow," "Like a Prayer,"
"Material Girl," "Express Yourself," and the contested song in this case,
"Vogue." Keith Caulfield, Madonna's 40 Biggest BillboardHits, BILLBOARD,
Aug. 16, 2015, http://www.billboard.com/articles/list/499398/madonnas-40-

biggest-billboard-hits.

61 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2016).
62 Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol27/iss2/5

8

Campbell: VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016)

2017]

VMG SALSOUL

239

in Vogue is also a quarter-note chord, but it is comprised of the
notes E, A-sharp, D-sharp, and F-sharp, played in the key of Bnatural.6 3 The double horn hit consists of the same notes in an
eighth-note chord, immediately followed by a quarter-note chord
consisting of all the same notes. 6 4 It was later determine that the
double horn hit was not an independent sample. 6 5 The single horn
hit was sampled and then used to create the double horn hit. 6 6
Salsoul asserted that Pettibone sampled material from Love
Break while creating Vogue 6 7 and therefore infringed its
copyrights to the composition and the sound recording of Love
Break.6 8 Specifically, Salsoul focused its assertions on the "radio
edit" and "compilation" versions of Vogue.69 During the course of
the radio edit version, 7 0 the single horn hit happens once, the
double horn hit happens three times, with a "breakdown" version
of the horn hit also occurs once. 7 ' The pattern of the horn hits in
this version is "single-double-double-double-breakdown." 72 In the
compilation version, 7 3 the single hom hit is played once, and the
double horn hit is played five times.74 The recognized pattern of
the horn hits in this version is "single-double-double-double-

63

Id.

6 Id.
6

Id. at 879.

66

id.

VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 875.
68 On appeal Plaintiff asserted a sole theory of infringement. However, in the
initial complaint Plaintiff asserted improper sampling of strings, vocals, congas,
"vibraslap,"
and horns from Love Break. Id.
6
Id. at 876.
70 The radio edit version is four minutes and fifty-three seconds long. Id.
71 No definition of a "breakdown" version of the horn hit is provided in the
record. The court deems it to be of minimal significance because neither party
asserted any significance to this type of horn hit in their briefings. Id.
67

72

id

7 The compilation version is five minutes and seventeen seconds long. VMG
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2016).
74 d.
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double." 75
On July 18, 2011, and February 16, 2012, Salsoul provided
the defendants in this action with notice of Copyright
infringement. 7 6 Salsoul filed a complaint against the defendants
on July 11, 2012, after defendants continued to distribute and
publicly perform the recording of Vogue despite notice of
copyright infringement.n The complaint alleged that defendants
were deliberately using the sound recording and composition
copyrights of Love Break without authorized permission. 7 8
Pettibone filed an answer on behalf of all the defendants on
September 6, 2012, asserting that plaintiff failed to state a claim. 7 9
The trial court dismissed the motion, prompting defendants to
file motions for summary judgment on May 6, 2013.82
B. DistrictCourt Decision
In determining whether to grant summary judgment on the
issue of copyright infringement the trial court determined that the
appropriation plaintiff sought protection against did not warrant

7 Id.
76 Defendants include Ciccone, Pettibone, WB Music Corporation, Blue Disque
Music Company Inc., WEBO Girl Publishing Inc., and Lexonr Music Inc. VMG
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1814127, *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
18, 2013).
n VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1814127 *9
78 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1814127 *9
7 Failure to state a claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). VMG Salsoul, LLC v.
Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1814127, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
80 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1814127, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
8 Two separate motions for summary judgment were filed by the defendants on
the same day. Together Ciccone, WB Music Corporation, and WEBO Girl
Publishing filed one motion while Pettibone and Lexore Music, Inc. filed a
separate motion. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1814127, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
82 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1814127, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
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copyright protection because it lacked originality. 8 3 The trial court
further elaborated that even if the horn hits were eligible for
copyright protection, the appropriation by defendants was de
minimis.84 In determining the issue of originality of the horn hits,
the trial court considered both the copyrightability of the horn hits
* 85
in the composition as well as the sound recording.
C. Ninth Circuit Opinion
On review, the Ninth Circuit found that for purposes of
determining summary judgment, plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence the defendants had actually copied Love Break.8 6
However, the Ninth Circuit used Newton v. Diamonct7 as the
authority on actual copying, and determined that actual copying is
not sufficient to find copyright infringement per se. 88 The court
determined that in order for the copying to rise to the level of
infringement it must be more than a de minimis use.89 However,
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Newton only applied the de minimis
exception to copyrighted compositions.9 0 Here, the Ninth Circuit
was tasked with determining: (1) whether defendant's alleged

VMGSalsoul, LLCv. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1814127, at *16 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
84 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1814127,
at *16 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
85 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1814127, at *20-29
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
86 Plaintiff s evidence included a sworn statement from Pettibone's
personal
assistant, Tony Shimkin, that he heard Pettibone tell a sound engineer to
incorporate sounds from Love Break into the Vogue recording. Additionally, the
plaintiff s presented reports from musical experts who had listened to both
pieces of music and determined that the horn hits used in Vogue had been
sampled from Love Break. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877
(9th Cir. 2016).
" 288 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004).
88 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877 (9th
Cir. 2016).
83

89 id.

90 Newton v. Diamond, 288 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).
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copying of plaintiff s musical composition for Love Break was de
minimis, (2) whether the de minimis exception can apply in cases
of alleged infringement of copyrighted sound recordings, and (3)
whether it was an abuse of the district court's discretion to award
attorney's fees to defendants. 9 1
i.

Application of the De Minimis Exception

In order to determine whether the defendants in VMG
Salsoul had infringed the composition copyright of Love Break,
the Ninth Circuit could only compare the written compositions. 9 2
Stylistic elements of the musician's performance of the
composition were excluded from consideration. 9 3 When the Ninth
Circuit compared the structure of the two musical compositions it
determined the defendants had copied two specific excerpts of the
hori portion of Love Break's musical composition. 9 4 The first
copied portion was a single quarter-note hom hit, 9 5 and the second
copied passage was a full measure that consisted only of rests and
the double hom hit. 9 6 The court proceeded by distinguishing VMG
Salsoul from Newton v. Diamond97 before determining that
defendant's use in this case was de minimis.98 In VMG Salsoul,
the sampled portion was much smaller than the sampled portion
that was contested in Newton. 99 The sampled hom hits used in
Vogue appear only five or six times and the single hom hit only
lasted a quarter of a second while the double horn hit measure,
including the rests, lasted less than a second.10 0 Additionally, the

91 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94

d.

95 id
96
9

Id. at 878-79.
288 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004).

98 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 879.
99 Id.

100 Id.
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Ninth Circuit found the defendants only sampled one instrument
from the Love Break musical composition and not the entire
composition. 10 Therefore, based on the above considerations, the
Ninth Circuit ultimately held that a reasonable jury would not be
able to conclude that "an average audience would recognize the
appropriation of the composition." 1 02
Moving to the analysis of whether the defendants infringed
the copyrighted sound recording of Love Break, the Ninth Circuit
shifted focus from the actual notes that were being played to how
the musicians played the notes.' 03 Relying on plaintiffs expert
testimony' 04 the appellate court found the defendant, Pettibone,
had copied a single quarter-note of a four-note chord, isolated the
sound of the horns, transposed the horn hit into a new key before
truncating the recording and then adding effects. 105 Before
inserting the horn hit into Vogue, Pettibone overlaid the altered
horn hit with sounds from additional instruments. 106 Due to the
identifiable alterations of the horn hit by Pettibone, the Ninth
Circuit found the horn hits used in Vogue did not sound identical
to the horn hits from Love Break.1 07 Additionally, because the
horn hits do not sound the same they are easy to miss when
listening to Vogue if the listener is not playing close attention.' 0 8
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "a reasonable juror could
not conclude that an average audience would recognize the
appropriation of the horn hit."' 0 9

102
1o3

id

Id.

104 "The chord 'was modified by transposing it upward, cleaning up the attack

slightly in order to make it punchier [by truncating the horn hit] and overlaying
it with other sounds and effects. On such effect mimicked the reverse cymbal
crash.... The reverb/delay 'tail' . . . was prolonged and heightened." VMG
Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 879.
15 Id. at 879-80.
106

1o
08

Id. at 880.
Id.

id.

109 d
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The Ninth Circuit's final consideration in reaching the
determination that a reasonable juror could not conclude that an
average audience would recognize the horn hit appropriation came
from the fact that plaintiff's own expert, a highly trained musician,
initially mistook Vogue to have misappropriated two horn hits
10 The Court reasoned that if a
instead of just the one horn hit.o
musical expert set out with the intent of determining which
portions of the song had been misappropriated could not discern
the portions of the song that had been copied, then it is
unreasonable to expect that an average audience member would be
able to discern the copying. 1 1 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendants finding the defendant's appropriation of Love Break
was de minimis.12

ii.

The De Minimis Exception and Sound Recordings

The primary issue that the Ninth Circuit faced in VMG
Salsoul was the question of whether the de minimis use exception
applies to copyrighted sound recordings, as it does to all other
copyrighted materials. 11 3 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that
the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 and Congress'
legislative history in enacting the statute established that Congress
intended for the de minimis exception to apply to copyrighted
sound recordings.1 14 The holding in VMG Salsoul has created a
circuit split with the Sixth Circuit. In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films,115 the Sixth Circuit held that sampling of
copyrighted sound recordings is per se infringement and that
Congress did not intend for the de minimis exception to apply to

110 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2016).
"'1 Id.
1 121Id.
3

Id. at 883.
11 4 Id. at 884.
11 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
11
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copyrighted sound recordings.11 6
Before coming to a differing conclusion with the Sixth
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit first analyzed the statutory text of
Sections 101,117 102,' and 106,119 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
The Ninth Circuit found nothing in the wording of these statutory
sections to suggest that Congress had intended to provide
differential treatment to the copyrights of sound recordings. 1 2 0
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that Congress had not intended
to eliminate the ability of individuals to take advantage of de
minimis copying with regard to sound recordings. 1 2 1 Plaintiff
asserts a statutory argument, similar to the Sixth Circuit's finding,
that Congress intended to eliminate the de minimis exception with
regards to copyrighted sound recordings.1 2 2 This assertion is
founded on the third sentence of § 114(b) of the Copyright Act of
1976.123 This section states:
The exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording under
11

117

VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886.
"Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of

musical, spoke, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are
embodied.
The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978).
118 Subject matter of copyright: In general
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, no
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following
categories: (6) sound recordings. ...
The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1978).
19 See supra note 16.
120 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 2016).
121 id
I22 Id. at 881.
123 Id. at 881-82.
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clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do
not extend to the making or
of another sound
duplication
recording that consists entirely of an
independent fixation of other sounds,
even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted
sound recording.124
However, the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the
plaintiff's, and the Sixth Circuit's, argument that § 114(b) is to be
read as granting copyright owners of sound recordings the
exclusive right to "sample" their own musical recordings.1 25
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit understood this section of the
Copyright Act to limit the rights of sound recording copyright
holders.1 26 In the view of the Ninth Circuit, § 114(b) of the
Copyright Act restricts copyright holders from asserting
infringement claims against musicians who mimic the copyrighted
material, even if the sound is identical, because it is not actual
copying.127 Therefore, in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, §
114(b) does not address the issue of whether Congress intended to
eliminate the de minimis copying with regard to copyrighted sound
recordings.1 28
After analyzing the statutory text of the Copyright Act, the
Ninth Circuit next looked to the legislative history of the statute to
determine that Congress intended for § 114(b) of the Copyright
Actl 29 to limit, not expand, copyright holder's rights.1 30
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit's findings were supported by a

124
125

The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1978).
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884.

126 I1d.

at 883.

127 id
12
8 Id.
129 The
130

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §114 (1978).
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.
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House Reportl 3 1 which stated, "infringement takes place whenever
all or any substantialportion of the actual sounds that go to make
up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced in phonorecords
by repressing, transcribing, recapturing off the air, or any other
method, or by reproducing them in the soundtrack or audio portion
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work."1 3 2 The support
provided by the legislative history and statutory text of the
Copyright Act concretized the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
Congress intended the de minimis exception to apply to
copyrighted sound recordings the same way de minimis copying
applies to any other copyrighted work.1 3 3
iii.

Attorney's Fees

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's award of
attorney's fees to the defendants.' 3 4 The district court had reasoned
that plaintiffs claim was objectively unreasonable because
plaintiff should have known that the Bridgeportl3 5 decision was
controversial and because the claim dealt with issues that relied on
"disputed facts and credibility determinations." 1 36 The Ninth
Circuit found that the district court erred as a matter of law and
remanded the issue of attorney's fees to the district court for
reconsideration. 137
IV.

ANALYSIS

Circuit splits create uncertainty and ambiguity in the law that
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5674.
132 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 883 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis

added).
133 Id. at 883-84.

134 Id. at 887.
35 BridgeportMusic, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
1 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877.
Id.
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can only be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.
However, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari, so circuit courts should be cautious when establishing
device precedent.138 In this particular case, the Ninth Circuit was
right to split from the decision of the Sixth Circuit. As the Ninth
Circuit observed, a deep split already exists among the federal
courts regarding the issue of whether or not to apply the de
minimis use exception to copyrighted sound recordings.1 39 A
multitude of courts not bound by the Sixth Circuit's precedent in
Bridgeport have continuously rejected the idea of following
Bridgeport'sper se infringement analysis.' 40
A. VMG Salsoul v. Bridgeport:Statutory Interpretation
The Ninth Circuit's decision to diverge from the Sixth
Circuit's holding is not arbitrary. Before concluding that the de
minimis exception should apply to alleged infringement of
copyrighted sound recordings, the Court first took into
consideration the Sixth Circuit's analysis in BridgeportMusic, Inc.
v. Dimension Films. 14 1 In Bridgeport, the Sixth Circuit found that
by adding the word "entirely" to Section 114(b)1 42 of the
Copyright Act, Congress granted sound recording owners the
exclusive right to "sample" their own recordings.1 43 In analyzing
this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit determined that the Sixth Circuit

138 Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN THE FEDERAL

CIRCUIT COURTS,
139

Id.

140

d

3

14 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005); Id. at 883.
142

"The rights of sound recording copyright holders under clauses (1) and (2) of

section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound
recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even
though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound
recording." BridgeportMusic, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01
(6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original).
143 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 2016).
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ignored the statutory structure and legislative history of the statute
which clearly indicated Congress was expressly attempting to limit
the rights of Copyright owners through § 114, not expand their
rights.

144

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit addressed the inverse logic
raised in Bridgeport. In Bridgeport the Sixth Circuit found that if
exclusive rights "do not extend to the making or duplication of
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent
fixation of other sounds," 4 5 then exclusive rights "do extend to the
making of another sound recording that does not consist entirely of
an independent fixation of other sounds."' 4 6 As the Ninth Circuit
emphasizes in its opinion,1 4 7 this thought process is illogical. This
inference creates rights for copyright owners from a statute that
was clearly set up by Congress to limit the exclusive rights of
copyright holders. 48
B. Sampling as a Physical Taking
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also addressed the Sixth Circuit's
contention that because "sampling" is equivalent to a physical
taking, then the de minimis use exception should therefore not
apply.1 4 9 First, the Ninth Circuit points out that physical takings
can occur with other forms of copyrightable material but that has
not prompted Congress to eliminate the de minimis exception from

144

id.

145

The Copyright Act of 1976m 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (emphasis added).

146 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884 (emphasis added).
147

id.

148 "The text itself is silent as to the rights of a copyright owner of a sound
recording when it comes to works that are not entirely independently fixed,
including where the work makes de minimis uses, as the use in Bridgeport
arguably is." Leah Somoano, Bridgeport Music, inc. v. Dimension Films: Has
UnlicensedDigitalSampling of CopyrightedSound Recordings Come to an
End?, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 303 (2006).
149 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801-02.
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being applied to such copyrighted works. 150 For example, the
Second Circuit has previously held that the physical taking of
copyrighted photographs for placement in a movie, without the
owner's permission, was de minimis and didn't warrant further
action. 151
Second, plaintiffs argue that sound recordings are of such a
different nature than other copyrightable works that it would make
sense for Congress to treat them differently with regards to
infringement.152 However, simply because they are of a "different
nature" does not mean that Congress has chosen to adopt a
different rule to handle infringement in such cases. 1 5 3 All
copyrights should be presumed to be treated equally unless
otherwise stated, regardless of their "nature."
Lastly, copyright law's main purpose is to protect the
expressive elements of an individual's copyrighted work not the
economic rewards for that expression. 1 54 Therefore, without the
monetary consideration of the taking, all that remains is the
concept that the secondary user has taken expressive elements of
the primary user's work.' 5 5 However, that is the case for all types
of copyright infringement; 1 5 6 the secondary user is appropriating
the expressive elements of the primary user without their
permission. Nothing about the "physical takings" argument with
regards to sound recordings distinguishes this category of
copyright from the other type of copyrighted material. Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit was correct to find that the de minimis excuse
should apply to sound recordings the same as it would to any other
allegedly infringed copyrighted work.1 5 7

ISO

VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885.

151 See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 215-16 (2d Cir.

1998).
152
15

VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2016).

3 Id

154 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
155 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885.
156See Somoano, supra note 149 at 303.
157 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884.
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C. Bridgeport'sBright-Line Rule
The Bridgeport decision created a bright-line rule that states,
"[g]et a license or do not sample."158 While this rule does not
foreclose sampling entirely, it does stifle creativity.' 5 9
The
alternatives to sampling provided by the Sixth Circuit are to obtain
a license or to duplicate the sound without using the original
recording. 16 0
However, the Sixth Circuit is presuming that
sampling and duplicating a sound are equivalent.' 6 1 What the
court does not address is that sampling is an artistic choice and by
prohibiting samples, per se, they are suppressing artistic
expression. The federal courts have a history of avoiding passing
judgment on artistic value, 1 6 2 but by instilling a per se
infringement rule for all de minimis samples, the Sixth Circuit is
ultimately judging artistic expression and creating a monopoly for
copyright holders of sound recordings.
By discouraging de
minimis copying the Sixth Circuit is allowing copyright notice to
signal not only that a work is protected, but that any kind of
reproduction without a license is prohibited. 163
The Sixth Circuit's bright-line rule in Bridgeportl6 goes
against the intentions of Congress and ultimately serves no
productive purpose other than to stifle creativity.' 6 5 Copyright law
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical
Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C.L. REv. 547, 575 (2006).
160 BridgeportMusic, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir.
158

159

2005).
161
62

1

163

164

See Arewa, supra note 160.
Bleisteing v. DonaldsonLithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1026, 1052 (2006).
410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
Eriq Gardner, Madonna Gets Victory Over 'Vogue' Sample at Appeals

Court, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, June 2, 2016,

http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/madonna-gets-victory-voguesample-898944.; Colin Stutz, Justin Bieber & Skillrex Sued Over 'Sorry':

Report, BILLBOARD, May 26,2016,
http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/pop/7385928/justin-bieber-skrillex-
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exists to "promote the progress of useful arts,"66 but by
misconstruing the statutory text of the Copyright Act and
eliminating the use of de minimis copying with regard to sound
recordings, the Sixth Circuit failed to promote the progress of
useful arts. Fortunately, after a decade of stifled creativity, the
Ninth Circuit is finally protecting artists and allowing musicians to
invoke the de minimis defense with regards to sound recordings.
In the eleven years since Bridgeport was decided, numerous artist
have had suits brought against them for unlicensed sampling in the
Sixth Circuit.1 6 7 However, now the Ninth Circuit will likely
provide a safe harbor for artist who sample minute portions of
songs without a license.1 6 8 Unfortunately, if that is the case, it is
likely that more musicians will flock to the Ninth Circuit to work
on projects in order to ensure their ability to bring a de minimis use
defense if litigation ensues.
D. Future Implications
De minimis use is important to the copyright realm because it
allows copyright owners to protect the elements of their works that
need to be protected.1 6 9 If the courts continue to allow copyright
holder to maintain a monopoly over even the most minute
elements of their work, there will eventually come a time when
there is nothing left for new artists to draw inspiration from. "In
other words, enforcing copyright for de minimis sampling is like
requiring a painter to obtain a license for the canvas upon which he
paints. The sample is simply used as the starting point for creative
sued-sorry-white-hinterland-dance (The suit against Justin Bieber was brought
in the Sixth Circuit.)
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, Article I,
§ 8, cl. 8.
167 Althea Legaspi, Madonna Wins 'Vogue'Lawsuit in Appeals Court, ROLLING
STONE, June 2,2016, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/madonna-winsvogue-lawsuit-in-appeals-court-20160602.
168 See Legaspi supra note 168.
169
Ringgold v. Black EntertainmentTelevision, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.

1997).
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work; although it provides an important foundation for the work, it
is not identifiable with the final product and the creativity of the
work stands on its own." 70 If the appropriation is so minute that
the average lay listener is unable to discern that there has been an
appropriation, then the copier has not actually benefited from the
original artist's expressive content. 17 ' However, it is unlikely that
the Supreme Court will let the circuits remain split on this issue
forever. Due to the uncertainties that a circuit split creates, it is
likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorarion this issue in
due time.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is important for artists to be able to draw
inspiration from one another in order to further advance and
progress musical art in our culture. It was clearly erroneous for the
Sixth Circuit to have held that applying the de minimis use
exception to sound recordings interferes with meaningful
copyright ownership of sound recordings. The Ninth Circuit's
thoughtful consideration of the statutory text and legislative intent
in VMG Salsoull7 2 provides a more logical approach to applying
copyright law to various mediums. While the consistency that
accompanies a bright-line rule always seems tempting, the per se
infringement rule laid out by the Sixth Circuit causes further
confusion. By attempting to carve out an exception to the
application of de minimis use, the Sixth Circuit established an
inconsistent standard that cannot be supported by copyright law.
The Sixth Circuit's approach creates ambiguity in the music
industry and ultimately frustrates creative expression.

John Schietinger, BridgeportMusic, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the Sixth
CircuitMissed a Beat on DigitalMusic Sampling, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 209, 234
(2005).
171 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 2016).
1 72
Id. at 871.
170
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Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit's decision in VMG Salsoull 73
provides a great service to the music industry. The Ninth Circuit
sets a standard for de minimis use that comports with copyright
law. Additionally, this holding has firmly established a deep
divide between the circuits on an issue that is highly controversial
in the music industry. As a result, the ambiguity that is created
from this divisive circuit split will ultimately bring clarity to the
application of de minimis use. A circuit split this disruptive will
require action by the Supreme Court in order to finally determine
the applicability of de minimis copying in regards to sound
recordings. Therefore, while circuit splits can cause uncertainty in
the law, federal circuit courts should not let the fear of creating
conflict impede their duty to properly interpret congressional
intent. 17 4 The Ninth Circuit did not allow conflict to prevent them
for exercising their judicial duty, and as a result the music industry
will be better served because of it.
Victoria Campbell*

173 Id.
174 Id.

at 886.
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